T h e note by Karpinos in the January issue of the Quarterly provides an opportunity to clarify what is and is not shown in recent analyses of the relation of mortality and fer tility to age distributions.^ I shall limit myself-as Karpinos does-to stable age distributions under various fertility and mortality schedules. Some of the recent discussion (notably Stolnitz's article and the latter part of my earlier piece) ex tends to other than stable distributions; but the points raised by Karpinos' note can conveniently be handled in the stabledistribution context.
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-a reduction in fertility always reduces the fraction at younger ages (below the mean age of a population, roughly speaking), and raises the fraction at older ages. The effect of changes in mortality, on the other hand, depends on the age composition of the changes. A uniform per cent improvement in the proba bility of surviving has no effect on the age distribution; aboveaverage improvements in survivorship in infancy and early childhood have effects similar to a rise in fertility-^yielding a larger fraction of young persons and a smaller fraction of older persons; while above-average improvements in survivor ship at ages above 50 increase the fraction at those ages. The majority of substantial improvements can be closely represented by a uniform per cent increase in the probability of surviving at all ages, plus an excess improvement under age 5 and over age 50.* T o ask whether an improvement in mortality of the usual form raises or lowers the fraction over 65 (with constant fertility) is to ask whether the excess im provement in survivorship under age 5 does or does not swamp any improvement over age 50. The analytical part of the discussion cannot provide an answer to this question. It can be answered only by looking at the age pattern of each mortality improvement.
A survey of 44 rather large changes in mortality risks shows that in a slight majority of cases the fraction over 65 would have been decreased had fertility remained at former high levels and mortality been subject to the recorded improve ment. This statement would hold for Scotland 1865 -1895 , England and Wales 1846 -1886 , Berlin 1878 -1901 , Breslau 1883 -1898 , Italy 1881 -1900 , Switzerland 1878 -1896 , Germany 1905 -1933 , Sweden 1905 -1925 , Norway 1905 -1925 , France 1900 -1935 , Canada 1928 -1941 , United States (Death Regis tration Area, white population) 1900 -1940 , Iceland 1905 -1935 , Netherlands 1905 -1925 , Denmark 1903 -1938 , New Zealand 1903 -1936 , German Federal Republic 1946 -1950 , Union of South Africa (European population) 1921 -1936 and 1936 -1946 , Japan 1923 -1953 , Jamaica 1921 -1946 , Portugal 1920 The Milbank M emorial Fund Quarterly
1940, and Mexico 1930-1940 (a total of 23 instances).
In most other instances, a slight increase in the fraction over 65 is more than offset by a larger increase in the youngest fractions (both increases of course occurring at the expense of intervening ages) so that the median age of the stable population is lowered by the mortality improvement. Ex amples of this are Belgium 1846 -1896 , Sweden 1846 -1896 and 1936 -1943 , Germany 1876 -1896 , Prussia 1856 -1896 , Nether lands 184^1885, Switzerland 1905 -1935 , Australia 1905 -1933 , Scotland 1911 -1931 , England and Wales 1911 -1931 , Denmark 1938 -1948 , Canada 1941 -1947 , Trinidad and Tobago 1921 -1946 , British Guiana 1921 -1946 , Chile 1920 -1940 , Ceylon 1921 -1952 , and Taiwan 1905 -1938 (a total of 17 instances).
Finally, there are a relatively few instances of large changes in mortality (for which a life-table record exists) where both the fraction over age 65 and the median age are increased. These are Norway 1936 -1947 , Netherlands 1936 -1948 , United States (white population) 1945 -1952 , and Republic of Ireland 1936 -1946 (a total of 4 instances).
All instances of the last category of mortality improvement are found in the recent history of low-mortality areas; and this category is inevitably destined to become increasingly prominent if mortality reductions continue. There is simply no more room in the advanced countries for further substantial improvements except of the form that would produce dis proportionately more old people, with only a minor offsetting effect at the young end of the age distribution.
T o turn now to Karpinos' specific statements. As an analytic proposition, it is beyond dispute that an increasing proportion of aged persons can arise from decreases in mortality, fertility, or both. I would insist that a decreasing proportion can arise from decreases in mortality (but not in fertility). As an em pirical generalization, it appears that the majority of the recorded large changes in mortality show a more prominent " youthening" than an " aging" effect. The most notable ex ceptions, however, are concentrated in the recent experience of low-mortality areas, as noted just above. I would disclaim any intention to explain the current aging of European and The analytical defect in Karpinos' table is more funda mental. The columns show the rising fraction above age 65 as the intrinsic rate of increase declines with the same life table. This rising fraction is quite properly attributed to de clining fertility. The rows in the table show a rising fraction above age 65 for the same r, as one proceeds to life tables with lower mortality. According to Karpinos, the increased frac tions over 65 are " mainly changes due to declining mortality." Actually, when mortality improves and r is fixed, fertility necessarily declines. Whether the tabulated increase in the fraction over 65 is caused largely or even wholly by this change in fertility depends on the age structure of the change in mor tality.
Consider the comparison shown in Table 1 : Following Karpinos' lead, we would say that the higher fractions over 65 with lower mortality and the same value of r are " mainly changes due to declining mortality." Actually, if fertility is held fixed, the later life table yields a smaller fraction over age 65. Hence the change shown in the table for the same value of r is caused wholly (and then some) by the decline in fertility required to yield a constant r with im proved mortality. That the differences in his table are in fact " mainly changes due to declining mortality" is the fortuitous result of his choice of (rather non-comparable) life tables.
T o summarize: Improvements in mortality can either in^rterlj to a n e uit title t '6 a?ef ^ That stable-age distributions, " though theoretical, can be advantageously utilized in general discussions on the expected effects of mortality and fertility on age structures" is readily accepted, provided their limitations are also clearly in sight. Since such distributions are inherently long-run, they provide little information or even guidance on transitions. Yet our interest as often as not is focused on 15 or 30 year consequences; indeed, most problems which have led to the postwar reexamination of the relations between vital trends and age have had just such time spans in view.* The more immediate reason for the present note is to correct an apparent misinterpretation by Karpinos of his data. The variations he shows in the stable-age proportion 65 and over for varying rates of increase and a fixed life table are, as he states, the results of fertility changes alone. It is not true,
